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Part 4 — J0URNAL ARTICLES (From the Western Political Quarterly, Vol. 28, June 1975) THE INITIATIVE: A COMPARATIVE STATE ANALYSIS AND REASSESSMENT OF A WESTERN PHENOMENON CHARLES M. PRICE California State University, Chico (Various excerpted pages from pages 208 - 227) Page
208 (Excerpted pages) Source:
Voter Initiative Constitutional Amendment Hearings
before the Subcommittee on the Constitution Of theCommittee
on the Judiciary United
States Senate 95th
Congress First Session on
S.J.
RES 67 December 13 & 14, 1977
AT
THE beginning
of the twentieth century the United States was
swept by the Progressive Reform Movement. As historian Leland Baldwin describes it, “No city or state was
without its would-be
reformers— sometimes
practical idealists,
sometimes disgruntled
politicians or business
elements seeking to overthrow the old regime, sometimes aspiring young men ready to seize any entree to power and pelf.”1 And,
unlike the
earlier Populist Movement which
had been largely western, southern, and rural in orientation, the Progressive
Reform Movement was more national in scope and to a varying extent middle-class
in mentality. 2 However, clearly, the Progressive Movement had its greatest influence and
longest lasting impact
far from the population centers of the East in the agrarian, formerly Populist sections of the interior, southern and particularly, western portions of
the United States. In these areas Progressives worked hard for and achieved a host of political
and social reforms. The
Progressives were preoccupied with one central political
problem:
the rampant corruption of
the political system. Major targets of the
Progressives tended to be the politicians,
political parties, interest groups and
political institutions of the country. To secure
their political goals the Progressives
advocated a wide range of political reforms
including the direct primary, Australian
(secret) ballot, presidential preference primary,
prohibition against political parties’ making endorsements
in primaries, cross-filing (candidates of one
party allowed to run in the other’s primary—”vote for
the man, not the party”), nonpartisan
local and state elections, women’s suffrage,
civil service ex- Note: The author would like to thank Bob Ross a colleague in the Department of Political Science, for his invaluable assistance and help with the statistical portions of this paper. 1Leland
D. Baldwin, The Stream of Americas History7 (New York: American Book Co., 1952), p. 381. 2 ‘Moat
standard American history books and political science texts refer to the
middle-clue mood of the Progressive movement. See, for example, Richard
Hoftstadter, TIE. Ag. of Reform (New York: Knopf, 1955), or George E. Mowrey,
TA. California Progressive: (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1951), or George S. Blair, American
Legislatures: Structures and Process (New York: Harper & Row, 1967), p.
392. However, this view has been challenged in several recant studies. Michael
P. Rogin and John T. Shover contend that the Progressive movement in
California was middle class only through 1910. Prom 1911 on, middle-class
voters deserted the Progressive banner, while working-class voters and new
immigrants joined the movement. See Michael P. Rogin and John T. Shover,
Political Change. in California: Critical Elections end Social Movements
1890—1966 (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Publishing Cc., 1970), pp.
33-61. Also, Roger E. Wyman, “Middle Class Voters and Progressive Reform:
The Conflict of Class and Culture,” American Political Scene. Review, 68
(June 1974), 488.504, argues
that in Wisconsin Progressive support tended to come from the poor, rural
portions of the state and that nationwide the Progressive movement support was
constantly shifting into new voting coalitions.
209 tension, popular election of
senators, short ballot, corrupt practices acts, publicity for campaign
expenses, the recall, referendum and the initiative. The basic strategy of the Progressives was to check and control
established political institutions by placing ultimate power in the hands of
the people.3 In his description of these
latter two reform devices, the initiative and referendum, political scientist
George S. Blair states: Simply
defined, the initiative is a device whereby a prescribed number or percent of
the qualified voters, through the use of a petition, may have an amendment or
legislative proposal placed on the ballot for adoption or rejection by the
electorate of the state or local community. The referendum, on the other
hand, is a means by which decisions of legislative bodies do not become public
policies until the electorate votes its concurrence with the policies and
accepts them by the required affirmative vote. Thus, the initiative may be
described as a device to correct legislative sins of omission and the
referendum as a means for correcting the sins of commission.4 By using the petition process voters
could qualify initiatives and
referenda for the ballot, thus effectively short-circuiting or bypassing the
traditional political channels of legislature and governor’s veto (and from
the Progressive perspective, the sometimes unscrupulous politicians
occupying those positions). While
political scientists during the first decades after the adoption of these
devices conducted research on the initiative and referendum and how they were
functioning, gradually, over the years, interest has waned within the academic
community. Overall, what has been written lately has been generally negative,
i.e., initiatives have become the tool of the special interests and voters are
easily misled by the moneyed side in these contests. With the exception of a
very few recent
articles, political scientists, for the most part, have paid scant attention
over the last ten years to the subject of direct legislation. As Howard D.
Hamilton notes: Any middle-aged member of the
political science guild in a retrospective mood might ponder a question:
“Whatever happened to direct democracy?” In our halcyon student days the
textbooks discussed the direct democracy trinity—initiative, referendum, and
recall—described their
mechanics and variations, explained their origins in the Progressive Era, told
us that the United States, Australia, and Switzerland were leading
practitioners of direct democracy, cited a few eccentric referenda, gave the standard
pro and con arguments, and essayed some
judgments of the relative merits of direct and representative
democracy. Latter day 3One
can trace to the contemporary setting many of the early themes emphasized by
the Progressives. For example, recent public
opinion polls suggest (particularly in the post-Watergate atmosphere) that the
public is increasingly rejecting the two established political parties, that
they are becoming convinced of the immorality and crookedness of many public
officials, and that they favor new reforms in the political system. A number
of new public interest lobbies such as John Gardner’s, Common Cause,
Ralph Nader’s Citizen Taskforce, and in
California, The People’s Lobby, have emerged over the last several years;
and clearly, the style and philosophy of these organizations coincides with
the earlier aims of the Progressives decades
ago — limiting and controlling the power of politicians and special interests
by giving
the public a
final check. ‘Blair,
op. cit.,
p. 306.
210 collegians
may pass through the portals innocent of the existence of the institutions of
direct government. Half of the
American government texts never mention the subject; the others allocate a
paragraph or page for a casual mention or
barebones explanation of the mechanics.’ Yet, as Hamilton notes,
initiative measures arc not trivial or routine but are often of critical
importance. Initiative Use This
study focuses on the currently, at least academically speaking, unfashionable
topic of direct democracy, and in particular, on the initiative. The major
purpose of this paper is to assess how this unique experiment in direct
democracy has been working recently (over the last ten years, 1962-72). In exploring
this topic several questions will be considered: What states allow for the
initiative option? How extensively is it employed?
Why in particular states? What factors relate to initiative use? And lastly,
what are the consequences of initiative use? Before proceeding with our
discussion of the initiative, however, a few comments about its alter ego, the
referendum, arc in order. The petition or protest referendum is, in
effect, the reverse side of the initiative; that is, voters using the petition
process can subject legislative acts to a popular vote. If approved by the
voters, the referendum can nullify legislative acts. Most states providing for
the initiative also provide for the petition referendum. However, the pattern
in states having the referendum seems clear-cut; it has fallen into disuse.6
For example, in California, no referendum has qualified for the ballot since
1942! The last significant attempt to qualify a referendum for the California
ballot occurred in 1966 when the California Real Estate Association
attempted to rescind the Rumford Fair
Housing Bill. After failing to qualify their referendum in the specified time
period, the C.R.E.A. began an initiative effort which eventually did qualify
for the ballot?7 Two major factors seem to work against
referendum use: (1) the problem of obtaining the specified number of
signatures in the abbreviated time period allotted before the act in question
goes into effect (initiatives arc not under quite as tight time constraints),
and (2) legislators usually avoid passing any bill on which a substantial
portion of the state’s population is in vehement opposition. Because the
referendum is used
so rarely in the various states providing for this technique, the initiative
shall be the main focus of this article. ‘Howard
D. Hamilton, “Direct Legislation: Some Implications of Open Housing
Referenda,” America
Political Science Review, 64 (March
1970), 124-37. 6Indeed, the word “disuse” may be a misnomer in describing the
situation in many states. For example,
New Mexico, a state providing for a referendum but no initiative, has never
had a referendum qualify for the ballot. 7See
Raymond E. Wolfinger and Fred J.
Greenstein, “The Repeal of Fair Housing
in California: An Analysis of Referendum Voting,” America
Political Science Review 62 (September ‘1968), 753-69,
for a
very discerning study of the voting
patterns on this proposition.
216 In considering Table 5, there does not
appear to be any clear relationship between voter rejection of initiatives and
their decline in use. From 1919—29, Montana voters approved 11 out of 16
initiatives, and yet since 1929 there has been a sharp decline in the number
of initiatives qualifying. In Missouri after 14 straight rejections between
1910 and 1919, Missouri voters in the 1920—29 period qualified 26 different
initiatives for their ballot. Ohio voters approved 3 out of 8 initiatives in
1930—39 and approved the only 2 initiatives to qualify between 1940-49, but
still initiative use has declined. Hence, there is no readily apparent pattern
linking rejection of initiatives with decline in use. In some of the other low-ranking states,
such as Nevada, Utah or Nebraska, the initiative has been used only sparingly
by interest groups and citizens ever since its inception. In these states
there has been no sharp decline in use over the last several decade; rather,
the initiative has never really become part of the customary political
processes. Clearly, if the initiative is not used to some extent in the early
years immediately after its adoption, it is likely to atrophy. Yet, it also
seems clear that extensive use in the first years soon after initiative
adoption does not guarantee there will be continued use. In the high-use states after much early use
the initiative seems to have become deeply engrained in the political culture
of the state almost like another step in the legislative process. Groups and
interests become accustomed to going the initiative route when the
legislature-governor channel is blocked, and individuals and interest groups
within the state have become adept in the intricacies of massive
signature-gathering campaigns.11 Finally, it should be noted that
initiatives do not seem to be qualifying for the ballot even in many of the
high-use states as frequently as they once did. In commenting on the declining
use of the initiative in Colorado, Professors Curtis Martin and Rudolph Gomez
state: There are several arguments, some of them
of questionable validity, presented in explanation of the decline in the use
of the initiative: (1) the major reforms that the people wanted during the
early years of the 20th century have now been attained; (2) the general
assembly is today more receptive to the demands of the groups seeking changes;
(3) problems are so complex that the voters are hesitant about attempting to
solve them; (4) the number of signatures needed on a petition to get a measure
on the ballot is prohibitive.5 Or, as Howard D. Hamilton with tongue in
cheek comments: A
casual explanation for the demise of
direct democracy without the courtesy of an obituary might run something like
this. In contrast to the ------------ 11Using
the Elazar Political Culture Model, most states having the initiative fall
along his moralistic-Moralistic/Individualist continuum (10 out of the 17
states listed in this category are initiative states). By collapsing
Elazar’s data into an M/MI TM
(i.e. moralistic
dominant, strong individualist strain, strong moralist strain) vs. I, IT, T/TM
(traditionalist strain) there is a Q =
.63 associating those in the first
category with initiative states. See Daniel J.
Elazar, American Federalism A View
From the States
217 opening
years of this century when life was simple and democratic feeling ran high,
bubbling with naïveté and excessive
optimism, in the latter half of the century
direct democracy was anachronistic for a polity of two hundred million whose
technical policy questions far exceed the
ken of every man
and require a minute division of labor
and responsibility, with decision-making
assigned to elites, legislative and
Bureaucratic, with specific competencies Direct democracy has no place in the
age of organization.13 In summary, it is evident
there are three distinct types of
initiative states: first, those states where initiatives have never really
been used to any great extent; second, those where initiatives were used
extensively during the early years after the initiative’s adoption, but
where there has been a sharp decline in use over the past several decades;
and, third, those states where there may have been some decline in use but
where there is still a steady and persistent number of initiatives qualifying
for the state’s ballot. However, if California’s reputation as a
pace-setting state means anything, it could be that initiatives are due for
a substantial revival. While there was a decline in initiative usage in the
1960s in California, recently there has been a reversal of this short-term
trend.14 Since 1970, twelve separate initiatives have qualified
for the California ballot.15 Among the most recent are: Governor Ronald Reagan’s tax limitation proposal voted down
by the electorate in November 1973; a campaign contributions—lobby
regulation measure successfully sponsored by Common Cause and The People’s
Lobby in the June 1974 primary election; and in the November 1974 elections an
initiative dealing with the damming of the Stanislaus River. Several other
drives to qualify initiatives failed, Included in this category are measures
which would have made California’s legislature unicameral, made marijuana
possession legal, allowed 18 -- 21 year-olds to drink alcoholic beverages
legally, and a fourth which would have regulated the state’s oil industry.
It is likely that one or more will be attempted again. III It
has been suggested over the years, that two prime factors associate with
frequent initiative use: strong pressure group systems and weak political
parties. Indeed, strong pressure group systems and weak political party structures
are, it is believed, often inextricably linked. Because initiatives are frequently
proposed by interest groups and since if they do qualify, weak political
parties offer voters unclear voting cues
on initiatives, it can be hypothesized 13“Hamilton,
op. cit., pp. 124-25. 14“Initiative
Make Big Comeback as Groups Seek to Bypass Legislature,” California
Journal (August 1972), pp. 229-30. 15
It is interesting to note that the great new surge of initiatives placed on
the California ballot has come after the state legislature became
thoroughly professionalized. Special interests, both liberal and conservative,
may have been thwarted by the tough, professionalized legislature and been
forced to take their proposals to the voter via the initiative. 16
Belle Zeller, ed., American Stat. Legislatures (New York: Crowell,
1945), pp. 190-91. 225
It should be
noted that the Walker Innovation Index was based on adoption patterns
on 88 separate programs over
a 100-year period, while the
Gray Overall Average Rank was based
on how states rank on three prime
issue areas—education, welfare and civil rights—over a similar time span. The rankings in this study were computed using the 1962—72
time period for initiative qualifying. Again, the null
hypothesis can be accepted in Table
11; there was little
statistical difference on the U
score and the Theta found
between high-use and low-use states
on the innovation rankings, or between initiative and non-initiative states. Lastly,
based solely
on the
Californian experience, several other
supposed shortcomings of the
initiative process can at least be
questioned. It has been contended repeatedly that the initiative, rather than being a citizen weapon, has become
a vehicle for special interests. For example,
Owens, Constantini and Wechsler express this view when they state: Such
(initiative] campaigns are very expensive and have become highly
sophisticated. Only well-organized, rather affluent coalitions of interests
can afford to pursue the kinds of professional public relation campaigns
associated with most ballot measures. The campaigns are often bitter,
emotional contests in which the voter is not likely to make a choice between
carefully argued positions. Instead, the voter is likely to be asked to
respond to false images and half-truths. Finally, it is relatively easy
for an interest group to put a measure on
the ballot.25 However,
recent California experiences with initiatives suggest this may no longer be true. Clearly, poorly organized and less
affluent California groups have been
able to place measures on the
ballot—the marijuana initiative, Proposition 18 in 1972; the coastal initiative, Proposition 20
in 1972; the environmental initiative, Proposition 9 in June 1970; and
others. Moreover, voters do not seem
as easily misled by deceptive advertising or expensive campaigns as was once thought. In
1972 on a number of key initiatives, and in 1973 on Governor Reagan’s tax initiative, the side with the most money actually lost. California’s
well-educated voters seemed far more
able to cope with intricate initiatives than had been presumed by political scientists.” It may be that the ------- that states may
be innovative at one point in
time but not in another, and the Walker rankings with
their aggregated tabulations
over a~ lengthy period do not always show this.
For example, Oregon over the
last several years has led the way in proposing environmental legislation to be later borrowed
by other states; yet, it
ranks 23rd in the Walker ranking (13th in the Gray rankings). See Virginia Gray,
“Innovations in the States: A Diffusion Study,” American Political
Science Review, 67
(December 1973), 1174-85; the Walker comment “Comment: Problems in Research
on the Diffusion of Policy Innovation,” pp. 1186-~1; and
the Gray
“Rejoinder, to ‘comment’ by
Jack L. Walker,” pp. 1192-93. 25John R.
Owens, Edmund
Constantini, and Louis F.
Weschler, California Politics and
Parties (Toronto: Macmillan, 1970), p. 273. 26John
Mueller, “Voting on the
Propositions: Ballot Patterns and Historical Trends
in California,” American Political Science Review, 63 (December
1969), 1197-1212, comes to similar
conclusions in his study For example
he notes that California voters do
not blindly follow the newspaper endorsements ~1
the metropolitan
press as had been frequently asserted or that
they vote negatively, on all
issues.
226 surprising
voting results on initiatives over the last several years is a temporary
phenomenon, but for whatever the reasons, the easy assertions about the
apathy, indifference, and susceptible nature of voters can at least be
questioned by the California experience. Hopefully, other political scientists
in the future will begin to analyze in depth initiative voting behavior in
order to test some of these questions. CONCLUSIONS There is little question that the initiative has been and continues to be primarily a western development. Only a few states outside the western half of the United States allow for the initiative, and in the few that do, it is used infrequently. On the other hand, most western states do provide for the initiative and extensive use is strictly a western phenomenon. Overall, there seem to be three separate types of initiative state: first, those where the initiative has been used persistently, though in some cases in somewhat reduced form, over the long time period the initiative has been in effect; second, those where the initiative was used during the first decades after initiative adoption but has since dropped off substantially; and third, those states where the initiative has never been used extensively. In
some states like
California, Oregon, Washington or
Colorado, the initiative has
become commonplace. It has become
merely another almost routine
part of the legislative process. Groups
and individuals in these states have become skilled in the intricacies of organizing massive signature-gathering campaigns and in
persuading voters. These features
do not seem to be the pattern in most initiative states. Additionally,
it was
noted that there did not appear to be any
relationship\between the difficulty of
a state’s legal requirements to qualify an initiative, and the number of initiatives qualifying in that state. In
order to summarize most clearly the
findings of this study, Table 12 has been constructed. In
the table the various potential
factors which did or did not
relate to initiative use are listed.
If a positive or negative association was found,
it is
listed as “positive” in
the High-Low (high-use versus low-use
initiative
states) column or, in the Yes-No (initiative states
versus non-initiative states) column. We
have found that weak legislative
parties and two-party systems
associate with initiative states. It was
also discovered that strong pressure group
systems, the C.C.S.L. functional
criterion, and high “Quality
of Life” associated with high-use initiative states. It should also
be added that some of the potential factors
approached statistical significance or had relatively high association scores, and, hence showed a possible relationship.
However, for the most part the “negative” conclusion suggests there is
little if any relationship between a potential factor and high-low, or
initiative-non-initiative states. Finally,
the most important overall conclusion of this study is to question the prevailing negative assessment of initiatives held
by politicians, not
unexpectedly, and academics and
journalists as well. The various conventional
227 TABLE 12 Summary
or Findings
wisdom views of the
initiative process were all discarded, and the familiar litany of
other criticisms of the
initiative process were found to
be, at the least, open to
question. The findings of this
study, and the California experiences
with initiatives over the last
several years, have led this
writer to question the prevailing negative assessment of initiatives. The initiative does provide a last resort to
the public to bypass a recalcitrant
legislature and/or governor. Indeed,
legislatures may very well find it to
their advantage to present propositions to the voters because of the inevitability of an initiative effort. It
is hoped that other political
scientists will reconsider this direct democratic
technique and its potential.
Clearly, initiatives do allow for
decisive decisions on particularly sensitive,
hard to resolve, issues.
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